A strange argument for average utilitarianism

Here is a somewhat wacky set of assumptions.

1. There’s just “one consciousness”. Wackiness analysis: I’m >80% sure a significant fraction of buddhists thinks something like this is true. This sets some weak lower bound on its wackiness.
2. The only morally relevant fact is how good a time this one consciousness is having. Wackiness analysis: This seems pretty plausible given the first assumption.
3. How good a time it is having depends on the quality of the constituent experiences, but not on the “size” of the consciousness. So for instance, doubling every person would not change how much this one consciousness is vibing. Wackiness analysis: This seems not completely dissimilar to saying that the thickness of the wires on which a brain is implemented does not impact its value, so it is not utterly wacky.

It seems clear that average utilitarianism is plausible conditional on the above assumptions being true. In fact, I imagine one might be able to argue that it is implied by the assumptions, but I want to avoid making that strong a rigorous claim because it would take too much time. I’m fairly certain that the above assumptions at least vaguely imply average utilitarianism.

Acknowledgments

I put less than 1% of my moral uncertainty measure on average utilitarianism.