Applicability to economics

**References and further reading** 

## Set-up

In the theorem, an individual agent is faced with options called *lotteries*. Given some <u>mutually</u> <u>exclusive</u> outcomes, a lottery is a scenario where each outcome will happen with a given <u>probability</u>, all probabilities summing to one. For example, for two outcomes *A* and *B*,

L = 0.25A + 0.75B

denotes a scenario where P(A) = 25% is the probability of *A* occurring and P(B) = 75% (and exactly one of them will occur). More generally, for a lottery with many possible outcomes  $A_i$ , we write:

$$L = \sum p_i A_i,$$

with the sum of the  $p_i$  s equalling 1.

The outcomes in a lottery can themselves be lotteries between other outcomes, and the expanded expression is considered an equivalent lottery: 0.5(0.5A + 0.5B) + 0.5C = 0.25A + 0.25B + 0.50C.

If lottery *M* is preferred over lottery *L*, we write  $M \succ L$ , or equivalently,  $L \prec M$ . If the agent is indifferent between *L* and *M*, we write the *indifference relation*<sup>[4]</sup>  $L \sim M$ . If *M* is either preferred over or viewed with indifference relative to *L*, we write  $L \preceq M$ .

## The axioms

The four axioms of VNM-rationality are then *completeness*, *transitivity*, *continuity*, and *independence*.

Completeness assumes that an individual has well defined preferences:

Axiom 1 (Completeness) For any lotteries *L*,*M*, exactly one of the following holds:

 $L \prec M, \ M \prec L, \text{ or } L \sim M$ 

(either *M* is preferred, *L* is preferred, or the individual is indifferent [5]).

Transitivity assumes that preferences are consistent across any three options:

Axiom 2 (Transitivity) If  $L \prec M$  and  $M \prec N$ , then  $L \prec N$ , and similarly for  $\sim$ .

Continuity assumes that there is a "tipping point" between being *better than* and *worse than* a given middle option:

Axiom 3 (Continuity): If  $L \preceq M \preceq N$ , then there exists a probability  $p \in [0,1]$  such that

 $pL + (1-p)N \sim M$